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diagramming of the elements of statements in legal texts. Modern logical
skills, not yet widely used by lawyers, can undoubtedly be acquired by law-
yers just as can skills in legal accounting.
As this Symposium opened with the description of one aspect of the pioneer
approach of applying scientific methods of research to jurisprudence (i.e., in
the form of "Jurimetrics"), it very appropriately closes with the description
of another pioneer approach, that of applying modern logic to legal research.
Modem research methods promise improvements which will be realized grad-
ually step by step, without even the possibility or the need for predicting the
ultimate outcome. One feature of the ultimate outcome nevertheless appears
clearly from the last article of the Symposium. Modern logic will undoubtedly
become a standard law school subject.
NiCHOLAS A. VONNEUMANt
INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. By M. P. Jain. Bombay: N.M. Tripathi Pri-
vate Ltd., 1962. Pp. xxvi, 668. ($7.00).
LAW as a comprehensive process of authoritative decision must be more
than a pre-existing body of rules stemming from the written constitutional
charter or the unwritten conventions. When applied to varying specific cases,
law must perforce draw, beyond the authority of the past, upon contemporary
community expectations as to the course of future developments and decisions
with respect to recurrent particular problems. The function of legal rules
is, therefore, to communicate the perspectives of peoples-to wit: their de-
mands, their identifications, and their expectations-about this process of de-
cision. Communications through the written constitutional charter or the un-
written conventions may be inadequate to express such perspectives. Written
words are inevitably obscure and incomplete. Similarly, doubts may often be
expressed about the compatibility of the unwritten conventions with the con-
stitutive goals of the community. Hence, any gaps, ambiguities, or contradic-
tions among the indices of community perspectives should be remedied by
recourse to a comprehensive map of community values.'
The Constitution of India, proclaiming India to be a Sovereign Democratic
Republic, came into force in 1950, driven by the hope of securing to all citizens
social, economic, and political justice; liberty of thought, expression, and be-
lief; equality of status and of opportunity. It was designed to assure the dig-
nity of the individual and the unity of the Nation. While this drive continues,
the dynamic current of contemporary developments in India places upon In-
tPatent Attorney, Houdry Process & Chemical Company.
1. McDougal, Some Basic Theoretical Concepts About International Law: A Policy-
Oriented Frame Work of Inquiry, 4 J. CoNFLicr REsoLuTIoN 337, 343 (1960).
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dian Constitutional Law an important duty to embrace the manifold of new
problems arising from the uncertain conditions still prevailing in the country.,2
The response of scholars and lawyers to these recurrent problems should be
focused on clarifying the hard realities which condition people's perspectives
with a view toward enhancing effectiveness and rationality in future con-
stitutional decisions. It is not merely a matter of examining past authority.
It is, in the final analysis, a matter of inventing and recommending new so-
lutions.
Dr. M. P. Jain purports to respond to this challenge in his book on the
Indian Constitutional Law. Yet, though the book contributes a great deal in
rendering more intelligible past experience in the development of the Indian
Constitutional Law, it has very little to offer towards extrapolating the course
of future development and evaluating new alternatives. Dr. Jain's principal
difficulty is his failure to distinguish between past decision and disciplined
future preference. By excessive brooding on past authority, he impedes the
creative impulse.
Of particular interest, where these inadequacies are apparent, is his account
of the relationship between the Indian President and the Council of Ministers
headed by the Prime Minister. Dr. Jain's view is that since the structure of
the Central Executive follows the British model, the powers of the Indian
President are, like those of the British Crown, only formal. Effective authority
is accorded to the Council of Ministers which is responsible to the Lower
House of the Parliament. Resting his argument on the theory of automatic,
compulsory application of the British conventions in India, Dr. Jain concludes
that the Indian President has "no function to discharge either in his discre-
tion or in his individual judgment"3 and that the advice of the Council of
Ministers under Art. 74(1) "is binding on the President."'4 But this view fails
to foresee a wide range of probabilities in the future 5 when, without Prime
Minister Nehru, the President may be required to play a more independent
role in the performance of his duty to "preserve, protect and defend the Con-
stitution and the Law."
The relevant development thus far, as documented by the author, only re-
flects, and to some extent implements, the intentions of the framers of the
Constitution. But this is just one factor to be considered in interpreting the
written constitutional provision such as Art. 74(1) or the alleged unwritten
2. For a recent statement on these conditions, see the message of the Indian Presi-
dent, Republic Day, January 26, 1964, reprinted in India News, Embassy of India,
Washington, D.C., Jan. 31, 1964, p. 1, col. 3.
3. P. 86.
4. Pp. 98-99. Art. 74(1) reads: "There shall be a Council of Ministers with the
Prime Minister at the head to aid and advise the President in the exercise of his func-
tions."
5. He seems to concede that in- a few extreme cases, e.g., dissolution of the Lower
House of the Parliament, appointment of the Prime Minister, and dismissal of the Min-
istry, the President has marginal discretion. P. 99. It is still unclear what operational
meaning he gives to the phrase "marginal discretion."
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British conventions. Equally significant is the question of how far past ex-
perience in regard to the authority of the President can serve, in the light of
contemporary expectations, as an effective guide for future problem-solving.
A proper answer would entail a balanced evaluation of the play and counter-
play of the political parties in the Parliament and the relative strength of the
personalities of the President and the Prime Minister. Current political trends
indicate that it will not be easy to perpetuate the existing predominance of a
single party in the Parliament. Nor is it possible to predict with confidence
that the Prime Minister's influence in the Parliament will always be as de-
cisive as it appears to be now. Similarly, no one can sense for suie that power
in the States will not pass into different hands. The party in power at the
Center may then not be the same as the one in the States and new problems
will confront the Presidency. If the President can mobilize reasonable sup-
port in the Parliament, there seems little doubt that, as time passes and the
need arises, he will play a more effective role, even in normal times, not-
withstanding the dogmatic assertions that compulsory application of the
British conventions makes the advice of the Council of Ministers binding on
him. The very first President of India-who was an eminent legal scholar in
his own right, not to mention that he was also the President of the Con-
stituent Assembly which wrote the Constitution-once, in a persuasive public
statement, refused to equate the powers of the Presidency with those of the
British Monarch alleging that "there is no provision in the Constitution which
in so many words lays down that the President shall be bound to act in ac-
cordance with the advice of the Council of Ministers."
Another instance of Dr. Jain's heavy reliance on the authority of the past
is his sermon on the scope of Executive power. He seems to assume that since
in a parliamentary form of Government the Cabinet must have majority
support in the Legislature, it is in virtual control not of the Executive alone,
but even of the Legislature itself. From this assumption he concludes that
"the Executive is not confined to discharging only those functions which
have been specifically conferred on it by the Legislature or by the Constitu-
tion."7 Clearly, such a view of an all-powerful Executive is attributable to
6. Calcutta Statesman, November 29, 1960. A good statement realistically defining
the powers of the President is found in Mathur, The Constitutional Position and Powers
of the President of the Union, (1962) I S.C.J. 15; see also Ayyar, Is the President of
India a nere Constitutional Head?, (1961) I S.C.J. 5. Contra, Nehru's Press Confer-
ence on July 7, 1959, The Hindustan Times, July 8, 1959, p. 1; and on December 15,
1960, id., December 16, 1960, p. 6.
7. P. 115. He cites two decisions-Moti Lal v. Uttar Pradesh Gov't, ALL INDIA
REP. 1951 All. 257, and Ram Jawaya v. State of Punjab, ALL INDIA REP. 1955 S.C.
549), wherein the courts upheld executive acts which did not have the specific sanction
of the Legislature. But in both cases the Courts did refer to indirect, if not direct, legis-
lative support for the executive acts in question. It is pertinent to observe that the court
more recently, in its advisory opinion in Ref. by President of India u/Art. 143(1),
ALL INDIA REP. 1960 S.C. 845, 855, appeared to close in on the issue of reconsidering the
scope of Executive power earlier stated in Ram Jawayds case, though it did not in fact
do so because it found enough in the facts to support its decision.
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an ardent belief in the 18th century norms of Royal Prerogative or Absolute
Monarchy. A view more in accord with contemporary constitutional theory
and practice would be that all three branches of the Government have been
accorded important roles in the national decision-process. Reasoning that,
since the scope of the Executive power is undefined, it is residuary, the author
proves too much; for, as a matter of fact, the scope of the Legislative power
is also undefined.
To give merely one example, since treaty-making is alleged to be an Ex-
ecutive act, it might be that the Parliament has no authority to participate in
treaty-making through the process of approval, or that the Judiciary should
automatically approve the Executive act of treaty-making even if the Parlia-
ment's approval has not been secured. Dr. Jain supports that view.8 To deny
Parliament participation in treaty-making would not only be contrary to ex-
plicit constitutional provisions,9 but also contrary to the trend, crystallized in
the theory and practice of a large number of countries, toward progressive
participation of the popular assemblies in the conclusion of treaties.10 That
denial would retard the future potential role of the Legislature and the Judi-
ciary which can be usefully brought to bear on decision processes. Dr. Jain
seems to have ignored the recent advisory opinion of the Supreme Court
in Ref. by President of India 'u/Art. 143(1)," which concluded that the
India-Pakistan Agreement involving cession of national territory to Pakistan
required legislative approval:
There is .. . no doubt about the legislative competence of Parliament
to legislate about any treaty, agreement or convention with any other
country and to give effect to such agreement or convention.'
2
Shifting to the author's analysis of the Central Legislature, one finds re-
curring evidence of an unqualified trust in the authority of the British con-
ventions untouched by examination of relevant contextual factors affecting
future development. He states that though the freedom of action of the In-
dian Parliament is controlled to some extent by the Constitution itself, yet
within the spheres and limits allowed to it, its powers are plenary. It may
pass laws of any sort, reasonable or unreasonable.' 3 Resting his conclusion on
the early decisions of the Indian Supreme Court,14 he asserts that the only
limitations on the "omni-competent" Parliament are those specified in the Con-
stitution itself, and the courts will not go beyond those written words:
8. P. 115.
9. Articles 73(1), 246(1), and Entry 14 in List I of the Seventh Schedule.
10. For a comprehensive exposition of the theory and practice of states, see K. Nara-
yana Rao, Parliamentary Approval of Treaties in India, IX-X INDIAN YEAR BooK oF
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 2 (1960-61).
11. ALL INDIA REP. 1960 S.C. 845.
12. Id. at 852.
13. P. 84.
14. Prominent among them are: In re Delhi Laws Act, 1951 S.C.J. 527; Gopalan v.
State of Madras, ALL INDIA RE'. 1950 S.C. 27.
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If the Parliamentary legislation does not infringe any constitutional limit,
then the function of the courts is only to interpret and apply the law;
courts cannot then go into the policy of legislation. 15
Implicit in his statement are strong undercurrents undermining the force of
manifold constitutional as well as extra-constitutional limitations of the Indian
Parliament and retarding inventiveness in the judicial process.
Ironically, in other areas Dr. Jain rejects "positivism" in favor of a policy-
oriented approach to judicial interpretation. But his resistance to extending
judicial creativity in legislative matters is paralleled by his failure to elaborate
on the significance of the recent abandonment of the literal approach in the
area of property rights. Dr. Jain would have achieved more in his effort to
relieve judges from "positivism" by recommending the expansion of Kochuni
v. States of Madras and Kerala '6 in the political and civil rights field. In
Kochuni, the Supreme Court departed from the mechanistic approach pre-
viously announced in Gopalan v. State of Madras.17 The reviewer shares
the doubt expressed by Professor Nathanson that "the approach represented
by ... [Kochuni] can be confined to property interests."' 8
Finally, the author's treatment of the functioning of Indian federalism
affirms the predominance of the Central Government.' 0 But he fails to take
due notice of the powerful pulls of the States and their conflicting political
and financial demands on the Center which might pose serious problems in
the future. Again, the nature of the difficulty is the same. He is so heavily
occupied with describing the existing centralization that the emerging era of
State-demands escapes his attention. Even at this time when the authority of
the Congress cuts across the boundaries of all States, the pressure of state
demands can be felt in many directions. But when the monolithic power of
Congress is threatened by those adverse political parties gaining power in the
States, the Central Government may not be able to enforce its authority to
the same degree as it does today. These are the important considerations bear-
ing upon the future pattern of federal-state relations. They cannot be lightly
treated in any analysis of Indian federalism.
Despite these shortcomings, this book can be recommended to both Indian
and foreign readers. Its documentation is abundant and Dr. Jain's careful
comparisons with other constitutions are invaluable aids to scholarship. His
work is a healthy response to a long felt need for a volume on Indian Con-
stitutional Law that would offer elaborate textual treatment, instead of me-
chanical commentary on the individual articles of the Constitution. It is at least
a partial answer to Professor Harrop A. Freeman, who, while reviewing
15. P. 84.
16. ALL INDIA REP. 1960 S.C. 1080. Cf. S.M. Transports, (P.) Ltd. v. Sankaraswami-
gal Mutt, ALL INDIA REP. 1963 S.C. 864, 873.
17. ALL INDIA REP. 1950 S.C. 27.
18. Nathanson, Idian Constitutional Law in American Perspective, 56 Nw. U.L.
REv. 190, 203 (1961).
19. Part IV, especially pp. 329-34.
1964]
914 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 73: 905
Basu's Shorter Constitution of India, complained that "nearly all Indian law
books are merely annotations of statutes, similar to . . .United States Code
Annotated." 20
SURYA P. SHARMAt
20. 60 COLUm. L. REv. 255, 256 (1960).
tGraduate Fellow, Yale Law School.
o MR. JUS'TCt' WJ.L LIAM 0. DMuG1) A.S
In honor of twenty-five years of steadfast Service
oa. the Supreme Court of the United States
The [Ldltors of the Yale Laxw Journal dedicate this issue.

